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NOTES
CIVIL RIGHTSITAX LAW-"UNDER COLOR OF" INTERNAL
REVENUE LAWS: THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES V. TEMPLE AND
§ 7214 IN THE "UNDER COLOR OF LAW" DEBATE
INTRODUCTION
On a normal day, most police officers are probably not worried
that their actions in the line of duty will result in an IRS audit of
their personal tax returns. Yet that is exactly the fear developed by
two New York City police detectives on March 5, 2003, when they
had the misfortune of arresting IRS Quality Analyst Eva Temple on
charges of aggravated harassment. 1 In the police car, after several
aggressive and violent outbursts, Temple informed the detectives
that, as an IRS employee, she had "the ability to initiate investiga
tions and audits [of the detectives'] tax histories" and planned to do
SO.2

Believing Temple would pursue the audits she had threatened,
the detectives reported the incident to the U.S. Treasury Depart
ment. 3 As a result, Temple was prosecuted under 26 U.S.C.
§ 7214(a) for willful oppression "under color of law" by an em
ployee of the United States acting in connection with an Internal
Revenue law. 4
United States v. Temple is the first case to consider the meaning
of "under color of law" in the context of § 7214(a).5 The concurring
opinion in Temple raises the issue addressed in this Note: In § 7214
cases, should a victim's subjective perception of an actor's authority
play any role in determining whether the act was done "under color
of law?"6 The majority opinion suggests that the detectives' per
1.
Ct. 495
2.
3.
4.

5.
cluding
6.

United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
(2006). These charges were unrelated to her employment. Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 134 (citing 26 U.S.c. § 7214 (2000)).
Id. at 137; First Impressions, 3 SETON HALL OR. REv. 113, 120-21 (2006) (in
Temple in the list of cases of first impression heard in federal courts in 2006).
See Temple, 447 F.3d at 141-45 (Wesley, J., concurring).
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ception of Temple's ability to initiate an audit is enough to find that
she acted "under color of law" as required by § 7214(a).7 The con
curring opinion agrees that Temple's actions were taken "under
color of law," but argues that the determination should be based
solely on objective criteria. 8
Discussion of the role of subjective beliefs in an "under color
of law" analysis is new only in the context of § 7214(a). It has been
debated for decades in respect to two civil rights statutes that also
contain the phrase: 18 U.S.c. § 242 and 42 U.S.c. § 1983. 9 In these
statutes, the phrase "under color of law" is defined as the abuse of
some state-granted authority, and is applied to government actors
who overstep the bounds of their authority.1° It is generally agreed,
in the context of §§ 242 and 1983, that a victim's subjective belief
that the wrongdoer was invoking some official status should 'not be
considered in the "under color of law" analysis.!l Such beliefs
could create liability in a government agent acting in a purely per
sonal capacity-a result these civil rights statutes were not intended
to achieve. l2
The concurring opinion in Temple adopts the reasoning used
by courts in § 242 and § 1983 cases to support its assertion that the
subjective belief of the victim has no place in an "under color of
7.

Id. at 139 (majority opinion).
Id. at 141-42 (Wesley, J., concurring). Specifically, the concurrence argues that
the court should look for objective indications of the defendant's official status, use of
that status to achieve the harm, and the victim's objective awareness of that status. Id.
at 145. Perhaps Temple could have been convicted using a completely objective stan
dard: the detectives knew she was an IRS employee, having arrested her at the IRS
office, and Temple knew they were aware of her status as a federal employee when she
made the threat, having told them that she was an IRS agent. Id. at 132 (majority
opinion). However, for the sake of argument, this Note will assume that the use of a
subjective standard was necessary for Temple's conviction and will demonstrate why it
was appropriate for the majority to take a subjective approach to the "under color of
law" requirement in the context of § 7214.
9. 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); see also Steve Libby, Note,
When Off-Duty State Officials Act Under Color of State Law for the Purposes of Section
1983, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 733-46 (1992) (summarizing courts' struggles with
objective and subjective analyses in § 1983 cases).
10. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988); Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91, 111 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
11. See discussion infra Part I.B.
12. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; Temple, 447 F.3d at 142 (Wesley, J., concurring);
Libby, supra note 9, at 733-46. Creating liability in an official acting in a personal ca
pacity is objectionable because, historically, § 242 and § 1983 liability for action "under
color of law" can only arise when the actor has "a bona fide identity as a state official."
Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of' Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323, 325
28, 401 (1992).
8.
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law" inquiry in a § 7214(a) case.B However, while the concurring
opinion is well reasoned under § 242 and § 1983 case law, that rea
soning is inapplicable to § 7214(a).
This Note contends that the appropriate measure of "under
color of law" must be determined in light of the particular statute
that employs the phrase. The phrase "under color of law" should
have consistent meaning throughout the United States Code, but, at
the same time, must be applied in the context of the individual stat
ute in which the phrase appears. This Note will demonstrate that,
in the context of § 7214(a), using a subjective measure of "under
color of law" produces a result consistent with the purposes of that·
statute and does not produce the same objectionable results as it
would in the civil rights statutes.
Part I of this Note provides background on the objective-ver
sus-subjective debate by taking the reader through judicial interpre
tations of the phrase "under color of law" as it is understood in
§§ 242 and 1983, the primary sources of "under color of law" inter
pretation in American jurisprudence. Part II introduces the legisla
tive history and purpose of § 7214(a) and gives a summary of case
law interpreting § 7214(a) to date. Part III summarizes the issue
raised in the Temple case-the proper application of the phrase
"under color of law" in a § 7214(a) case. Finally, Part IV demon
strates that a subjective measure of "under color of law" is appro
priate in § 7214(a) cases, and concludes that the Temple majority
correctly considered the detectives' sUbjective perception of Tem
ple's authority to find that she acted "under color of law."
I.

A.

"UNDER COLOR OF LAW" IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE

The Definition of "Under Color of Law"

By the time the phrase "under color of law" appeared in
American statutes in the nineteenth century, it was a commonly
known expression that had been used in English laws since the thir
teenth century.14 The phrase "implies a misuse of power made pos
13. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 141-45 (Wesley, J., concurring).
14. Winter, supra note 12, at 326-27. In his article concerning the construction of
42 U.S.c. § 1983, Winter traces the history of the phrase "colour of office," or "colore
officii" back to a 1275 English statute providing "[t)hat no Escheator, Sheriff, nor other
Bailiff of the King, by Colour of his Office, without ... Authority certain pertaining to
his Office, disseise any Man [of his property)." Id. at 325 (first alteration in original)
(quoting 3 Edw.l, ch. 24 (1275) (Eng.)). Winter provides several other examples of use
of the phrase "under color of law" in England. Id. at 326-28. He concludes that, by the
time of its adoption in American statutes in the 1860s, this expression had become a
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sible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the
state."15 While this definition accurately reflects the commonly ac
cepted meaning of "under color of law" in American legal
thought,16 it belies the difficulty courts have had in applying this
concept to the facts of any given caseP
The phrase "under color of law" appears more than fifty times
in the current U.S. Code.1 8 Yet, the meaning of the phrase has been
considered most often in the context of two civil rights statutes: 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a civil remedy for any deprivation of
constitutional rights perpetrated "under color of law,"19 and its
counterpart criminal provision, 18 U.S.c. § 242.20 Sections 242 and
1983 were both enacted during the Reconstruction era?1 in 1866
and 1870 respectively, to impose criminal and civil penalties on offi
cials in the South who were depriving African Americans of their
constitutional rights. 22 The primary purpose of these statutes was
term of art referring to actions of officials that appeared to be authorized but, in fact,
were not. Id.
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 282 (8th ed. 2004) [hereinafter BLACK'S]. This
definition is almost identical to the definition of "under color of law" fashioned by the
Court in United States v. Classic. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
16. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183-85 (1961), overruled in part by Monell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling the Monroe holding regarding
liability for municipalities under § 1983, but leaving intact the definition of "under color
of law"); Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
17. Winter, supra note 12, at 327; see infra Part I.B (reviewing cases interpreting
the phrase "under color of law").
18. This number is based on a search of the United States Code, in both Lexis and
Westlaw databases, for the phrase "under color of law" in text segments of the Code.
Each database located a slightly different number of statutes containing the phrase.
However, a comparison of the two sets of results determined that the phrase "under
color of law" appeared in the same fifty-three statutes in each database.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, ... of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law.
Id. (emphasis added).
20. 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000). This statute provides, in relevant part: "Whoever,
under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any
person ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or pro
tected by the Constitution or laws of the United States" will be subject to criminal
penalties. Id. (emphasis added).
21. The period of reorganization in the United States following the American
Civil War. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1040 (11th ed. 2005)
[hereinafter MERRIAM-WEBSTER].
22. See Richard H.W. Maloy, "Under Color or-What Does it Mean?, 56 MER.
CER L. REV. 565, 571-72 (2005); Eric A. Harrington, Note, Judicial Misuse of History
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to enforce the newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment and prevent
the attempts of southern states to reestablish the pre-Civil War so
cial order. 23 This goal was recognized by the Court in Monroe v.
Pape, which stated:
[O]ne reason [§ 1983] was passed was to afford a federal right in
federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect,
intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and
the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and
immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be
denied by the state agencies. 24

It is in the context of these civil rights statutes, which aimed to

enforce the Fourteenth Amendment against the states, that the
common definition of the phrase "under color of law" has evolved
in American law. 25 This definition has been parsed out primarily by
three Supreme Court cases interpreting §§ 242 and 1983-United
States v. Classic,26 Screws v. United States,27 and Monroe v. Pape. 28
1. The Classic Definition
The case of United States v. Classic gave the Supreme Court its
first opportunity to consider the meaning of "under color of law" in
18 U.S.c. § 242.29 In Classic, the defendants were charged with act
ing "under color of law" to deprive citizens of their constitutional
and § 1983: Toward a Purpose-Based Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1006 (2007) (Sec
tion 1983 "targeted the [Ku Klux] Klan, including those members holding official posi
tions in government. It aimed to break the rebellion, restore order to the South, and
vindicate the rights of Freedmen.").
23. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934 n.17 (1982) (noting that in
the debate, the bill was "described as a bill 'to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States' "); Winter, supra note 12, at 395
("In Reconstruction, the concern with oppression under pretense of law ... confronted
the attempt to subvert the post-War legal regime ...."); Adam S. Lurie, Note, Ganging
Up on Police Brutality: Municipal Liability for the Unconstitutional Actions of Multiple
Police Officers Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983,21 CARDOZO L. REV. 2087, 2091 (2000).
24. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
25. See United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 495 (2006); Maloy, supra note 22, at 608-09; Seth M. Kean, Note, Municipal Lia
bility for Off-Duty Police Misconduct Under Section 1983: The "Under Color of Law"
Requirement, 79 B.U. L. REv. 195, 210-11 (1999); Libby, supra note 9, at 728.
26. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
27. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).
28. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-85.
29. See Classic, 313 U.S. at 308-09. The Court was actually interpreting the pre
cursor to 18 U.S.c. § 242, which outlawed action taken "under color of any law" to
deprive another of his rights under the "Constitution and laws of the United States."
Id. at 309-10.
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right to vote by altering ballots in the course of their official duties
as commissioners of elections. 30 The Court held that action taken
"under color of law" is the "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue
of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law."31 In making this statement,
the Court borrowed principles from earlier Fourteenth Amendment
cases holding that, where an official uses his state-granted power in
a manner that violates the Fourteenth Amendment, he is a state
actor, whether or not the state actually authorized that specific
act. 32
Intrinsic in the holdings of Classic and the Fourteenth Amend
ment cases is that the actor must have some connection with the
sovereign to be liable for depriving another of his constitutional
rights. 33 As one commentator stated: "[t]his connection with the
sovereign is necessitated by the fact that there is no constitutional
prohibition against an individual depriving another of his ... rights,
and if the statutes are to be enforced against an individual, the indi
vidual must be found connected to the sovereign in some fash
ion."34 In Classic, it was the defendants' status as elections
commissioners that connected them to the state and gave them the
opportunity to alter the ballots and interfere with the citizens' right
to vote. 35 Because the commissioners were acting under the pre

30. Id. at 307.
31. Id. at 326 (emphasis added).
32. See id. (citing Hague v. Comm. Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 507, 519 (1939);
Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278,287 (1913); Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346 (1879)).
33. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 347 ("Whoever, by virtue of public
position under a State government, deprives another" of due process or equal protec
tion "as he acts in the name and for the State, and is clothed with the State's power, his
act is that of the State.").
34. Maloy, supra note 22, at 648; accord Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 936-37 (1982).

Careful adherence to the "state action" requirement preserves an area of indi
vidual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.
It also avoids imposing on the State ... responsibility for conduct for which [it]
cannot fairly be blamed ....
Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the State.
Id. at 936-37. Professor Maloy ultimately concludes that the only thing clear about the
expression "under color of law" in the civil rights statutes is that it is synonymous with
state action. Maloy, supra note 22, at 646.
35. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941).
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tense but beyond the scope of their state authority, their actions
were deemed to have been taken "under color of law."36
Four years later, in another § 242 case, the Court reiterated the
definition of "under color of law" set out in Classic. 37 In Screws v.
United States, the Court affirmed the conviction of three Georgia
police officers for beating an African American arrestee to death.
Finding this case "indistinguishable" from Classic, the Court noted
that "[i]n each [case] officers of the State were performing official
duties; in each the power which they were authorized to exercise
was misused. "38
The Screws Court adopted the Classic interpretation of "under
color of law," calling it the product of "mature consideration," not
"hasty action or inadvertence."39 The Court added depth to the
Classic rule saying: "[A]cts of officers in the ambit of their personal
pursuits are plainly excluded. [But a ]cts of officers who undertake
to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to
the line of their authority or overstep it."40 By excluding action
taken in the course of personal pursuits, this holding is consistent
with the notion that an actor must have some connection to the
state to be held accountable for interference with another's consti
tutional rights. 41 Therefore, because the goal of §§ 242 and 1983 is
to prevent the deprivation of another's constitutional rights, the
wrongdoer must be deemed a state actor to be held liable under
those statutes. 42 Finally, the Court noted that the Classic construc
tion of "under color of law" will be precedent in this area of law
unless Congress acts to change it. 43

36. See id. at 326. It is worth noting that the opinion examines the legislative
history of § 242 to ensure that the qualification that a wrongful act was taken based on
alienage, color, or race only applied to the second offense created by the statute and not
to the deprivation of rights provision. [d. at 326-28. The Court concluded that the
deprivation of rights provision applied regardless of the victim's alienage or color. Id.
37. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-12 (1945).
38. Id. at 110. The police officers in this case were authorized by law to make the
arrest and use the force necessary to affect it. Id. at 111. They acted without authority
by using excessive force. Id.
39. Id. at 112.
40. Id. at 11I.
41. See Maloy, supra note 22, at 648.
42. See 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167,180 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978);
supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
43. Screws, 325 U.S. at 112-13.
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2. The Monroe Application of the Classic Definition
Twenty years after Classic was decided, its interpretation of
"under color of law" was again affirmed, and extended to § 1983
cases in Monroe v. Pape. 44 The Court found that the Classic defini
tion of "under color of law" satisfied the legislative purpose of
§ 1983, and was intended to be a governing rule of law. 45 In addi
tion, the Court observed that it would only create uncertainty in the
law if the meaning of "under color of law" was varied "to meet the
exigencies of each case. "46
The Court further noted that, in the time since the Classic and
Screws decisions, Congress had revised the civil rights laws and en
acted three new laws containing the phrase "under color of law"
without any debate or fuss over the inclusion of that phrase. 47 Spe
cifically, the Court said:
If the results of our construction of "under color of" law

were as horrendous as now claimed . . . surely the voice of the
opposition would have been heard in . . . Committee reports.
Their silence and the new uses to which "under color of" law
have recently been given reinforce our conclusion that our prior
decisions were correct on this matter of construction. 48

For these reasons, the Monroe Court concluded that Classic
provided the correct meaning of the phrase "under color of law"
and that this definition would be used in future § 1983 cases. 49 To
date, the Classic definition has remained untouched by Congress or
the Supreme Court. 50 However, the existence of an established def
44. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183-87. In Monroe, the plaintiff sued the Chicago Police
Department and thirteen officers individually for deprivation of his civil rights when
they entered Monroe's home without a warrant and detained him without charges or a
hearing before a magistrate. Id.
45. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184-85 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 112-13). The Court,
after a detailed examination of the legislative history of § 1983, concluded that Con
gress intended § 1983 to remedy the harms caused by abuses of authority and, there
fore, that the definition of "under color of law" as a misuse of power was consistent
with the purposes of the statute. Id. at 172-83; see also Harrington, supra note 22, at
1008. Sections 242 and 1983 were both enacted shortly after the Civil War with the
intent to remedy the inequitable legal treatment of emancipated African Americans.
See generally Maloy, supra note 22, at 569-84 (recounting the social and legislative his
tory of §§ 242 and 1983).
46. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 185 (quoting Screws, 325 U.S. at 113).
47. Id. at 186.
48. Id. at 187.
49. Id.
50. This is not to say that there has not been criticism of the Classic definition.
See id. at 211-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); accord Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of'

2009]

"UNDER COLOR OF" INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS

123

inition of "under color of law" has not simplified application of the
concept in § 242 and § 1983 cases. 51
B.

Application of "Under Color of Law" in § 242 and § 1983
Cases

This Section reviews the difficulty courts have had in applying
the Classic definition of "under color of law" in § 242 and § 1983
"personal capacity"52 cases. 53 The Classic and Screws decisions
mandate that the wrongful conduct in a § 242 or § 1983 case must
rise to the level of state action before a penalty can be imposed for
the deprivation of constitutional rights. 54 Because these statutes do
not apply to a private individual, absent some connection to the
sovereign, courts must be sure that the wrongdoer was acting under
What Law: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499 (1985)
(arguing that the definition of "under color of law" applied in Monroe is wrong and that
"under color of law" actually means authorized by law). In fact, there is still debate
over the meaning of analogous phrases like "official capacity." See, e.g., Steven J. Mul
roy, "Official" Explanation: Defining "Official Capacity" and Related "Color of Office"
Phrases in Bribery and Extortion Law, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 587 (2008). This article
does not specifically address the phrase "under color of law" or the standard by which it
should be measured, but it does note vagueness in the scope of the phrase "official
capacity." Id. at 589-90, 634-35 (arguing that the narrower meaning-that the action
must be directly connected to the official duties-should be applied).
51. See infra notes 173-180 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differ
ence between interpretation and application.
52. Professor Maloy notes that the Court has used the phrase "personal capacity"
to describe § 1983 cases in which the wrongdoer is a private party acting with some type
of state authority and distinguished them from "official capacity" cases, in which the
wrongdoer is the state itself. Maloy, supra note 22, at 599-600. This distinction is im
portant because in cases where the wrongdoer is a private individual, courts have the
additional burden of determining whether the individual has a sufficient connection
with the sovereign to make him a state actor under §§ 242 and 1983.
53. See Douglas S. Miller, Off Duty, Off the Wall, But Not Off the Hook: Section
1983 Liability for the Private Misconduct of Public Officials, 30 AKRON L. REV. 325,328
(1997) ("That the lower federal courts are having trouble drawing the line between
public and private conduct can hardly be denied."). This difficulty arises most often in
cases where the state official was off duty at the time that the injury occurred. Libby,
supra note 9, at 732-33 ("[L]ower courts have had difficulty applying Supreme Court
'under color of law' principles and have implemented inconsistent approaches in re
sponse to cases in which the actor is off duty."). Part of the difficulty for lower courts is
that the definition of "under color of law" was developed by the Supreme Court in
cases where the wrongdoers were clearly acting in the course of their official duties.
See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169 (police officers conducting investigation); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (police officers acting to affect arrest); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 325-26 (1941) (commissioners of elections counting bal
lots and reporting election results). The Court "has not addressed when an off-duty
state official is acting under color of law." Libby, supra note 9, at 732.
54. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; Classic, 313 U.S. at 326.
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the actual or apparent authority of the state before finding that the
action was taken "under color of law."55
In order to determine whether a connection with the state ex
ists, courts first have to determine what type of evidence they will
use to measure the presence or absence of state authority: Should
they consider objective manifestations of state authority,56 the sub
jective intent of the actor to use her authority,57 the subjective per
ception of the victim that the actor had authority,58 or some
combination of the three?59 The remainder of this section reviews a
sample of cases that highlight this question and courts' attempts to
answer it.

55. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982) ("Action by a
private party pursuant to [§ 1983], without something more, [is] not sufficient to justify
a characterization of that party as a 'state actor.' "). Courts have created many different
tests to determine whether the necessary connection between the individual and the
sovereign is present. See id. (listing several tests used to determine if a private party is a
state actor, including the "public function" test, "state compulsion" test, "nexus" test,
and "joint action" test); Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.
1999) ("totality of the circumstances" test); Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115,
1118 (7th Cir. 1995) (focusing on the nature of the act); Keller v. District of Columbia,
809 F. Supp. 432, 436 (E.D. Va. 1993) ("outward indicia of state authority"); Miller,
supra note 53, at 336-57. However, in the words of Justice Byron White, it would be
impossible to formulate "an infallible test for determining whether the State ... has
become significantly involved in private discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369, 378 (1967).
56. See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001); Pitchell
v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994); Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F. Supp. 2d
463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
57. See, e.g., Keller, 809 F. Supp. at 435 (discounting the argument that subjective
intent of the wrongdoer should be considered in an "under color of law" analysis). In
Keller, the police-officer defendants argued that they could not be held liable under
§ 1983 for detaining an individual outside of their jurisdiction because the officers did
not believe that they were acting within the scope of their duties. Id. The court re
jected that defense saying "[n]either reason nor precedent supports the argument that
the 'under color of law determination should turn on the subjective understanding of
the actor concerning the scope of his duties." Id. (emphasis added). Because the Tem
ple concurrence only raises issues concerning a victim's subjective beliefs, this Note will
not review cases discussing the role of the actor's subjective beliefs. See United States
v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., concurring), cen. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 495 (2006).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006); Zambrana
Marrero, 172 F.3d at 122.
59. For a good summary of the different objective and subjective concerns see
Libby, supra note 9.
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Objective Standard

Logic dictates that in order for harm to be caused by the ac
tor's official status, the victim must be aware of that status at the
time of the act. 60 However, many courts are uncomfortable using a
subjective test "because it puts the 'color of law' question solely in
the hands of the plaintiff."61 For example, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has stated definitively that to focus on the vic
tim's reaction to the conduct, rather than the nature of the conduct
itself, "misses the essence of the color of law requirement and the
protection afforded by section 1983."62 Likewise, a Federal District
Court in New York concluded that "under color of law" is an objec
tive analysis and neither the victim's subjective understanding, nor
the actor's subjective intent is relevant. 63
The concern is that if a court were to consider the plaintiff's
sUbjective perception, the plaintiff would be able to create liability
for a defendant engaged in purely personal pursuits that § 1983 was
not meant to reach. 64 Two recent § 1983 decisions demonstrate the
approach taken by many courts-that subjective beliefs have no
place in the "under color of law" analysis. 65
In Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the city manager's rape of another city employee was made possible
only by virtue of his government authority.66 In that case, the court
60. See Miller, supra note 53, at 345-46.
61. Id. at 346. Specifically, Miller raises concerns about defining what it means to
perceive "action of the state." Id. at 345-46. He also addresses problems with the tem
poral element: What if the plaintiff did not know the actor was vested with state author
ity at the time of the incident but later finds out and testifies that he now perceives the
conduct as some misuse of official authority? Id.
62. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548-49 (2d Cir. 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that he would not have been shot by the off-duty police officer but for the
plaintiff's subjective perception that he was safe because he was in "police presence").
63. Davis v. Lynbrook Police Dep't, 224 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(denying defendant's motion for summary judgment because sufficient evidence was
presented so that, even without considering the plaintiff's subjective belief, a reasonable
jury could find action "under color of law").
64. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945). This is one of the con
cerns raised by the Temple concurrence: "[E]ven where the official never mentions or
uses ... her position as a government official, a victim's belief ... no matter how
unreasonable, can result in liability for the defendant." United States v. Temple, 447
F.3d 130, 142 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., concurring), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006);
cf Libby, supra note 9, at 744 (observing a problem on the other end of the spectrum,
that consideration of the plaintiff's subjective impression could allow a defendant who
should be found to be acting "under color of law" to avoid § 1983 liability).
65. Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001); Samedi v.
Miami-Dade County, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
66. Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1304-05.
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relied on testimony of various witnesses as objective evidence that
the manager had used his state-granted authority over the victim to
create the opportunity to be alone with her on the occasion of the
rape. 67 Because there was objective testimony that the defendant's
authority as a state official facilitated the wrongful act, the court
found that he acted "under color of law" within the meaning of
§ 1983. 68

Conversely, in Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, a sexual harass
ment case brought under § 1983, a Federal District Court in Florida
found that the defendants did not act "under color of law" where
the plaintiff failed to present objective evidence of the wrongdoer's
authority.69 In that case, despite the plaintiff's belief that the de
fendants were her bosses, and the defendants' admissions that they
made statements to that effect, the court found that the plaintiff did
not present any objective evidence that the defendants "possessed
... state authority with respect to [the] Plaintiff."70 Noting that
there was no precedent to support the proposition "that a plaintiff's
subjective belief as to a defendant's authority, without more, is suf
ficient to establish that the defendant acted under color of law
under section 1983," the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. 71
2.

Subjective Standard

Despite the prevalence of the objective approach, courts in
several circuits have considered the role of a victim's subjective per
ception in an "under color of law" analysis. In a § 1983 action
against two off-duty police officers whose intervention in a bar fight
led to the death of one fighter, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit noted that "subjective reactions of the victim may have
some relevance" in the "under color of law" analysis. 72 Most re
cently, despite the Second Circuit's clear dismissal of the role of
Id. at 1303-05.
Id. at 1305.
Samedi, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 134l.
70. Id. at 1340.
71. Id. at 1339.
72. Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 126 (1st Cir. 1999). How
ever, the court went on to say that" 'the primary focus . .. must be on the conduct of
the [actor], ... and whether [that conduct] 'related in some meaningful way ... to [his]
governmental status or to the performance of his duties.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quot
ing Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 1999); Martinez v. Colon,
54 F.3d 980, 987 (1st Cir. 1995».
67.
68.
69.
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victims' subjective beliefs in Pitchell,73 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of the mayor of Waterbury,
Connecticut, based on the victims' belief that he was invoking his
official authority.74
Mayor Philip Giordano was charged under § 242 with acting
"under color of law" to deprive two girls of their constitutional
rights when he sexually abused them.7 5 There was no objective evi
dence that Giordano ever used his power as mayor to perpetrate
the sexual assaults.7 6 However, both victims testified that they
knew he was the mayor and thought that he had the power to "rule
over everybody" and have them put in jaiL77 The court found that
the victims' belief that Giordano could use his authority to harm
them if they told on him was sufficient to find that "the abuse was
made possible" because he had acted "under color of law."78
The Giordano decision has revived uncertainty about the role
that a victim's subjective understanding should play in the "under
color of law" analysis. 79 Considering that Temple was decided by
the Second Circuit less than two months after Giordano,80 the Tem
ple concurrence points out that these back-to-back decisions may
be read to imply that subjective perceptions are significant to the
"under color of law" inquiry.s1 However, because Temple was liti
gated under § 7214(a), a statute created for a different purpose than
§§ 242 or 1983, this implication is neither as weighty, nor as prob
lematic, as the concurrence suggests.
II.

26 U.S.c. § 7214(A)

In 1868, Congress enacted what is now 26 U.S.c. § 7214,
criminalizing certain conduct by federal employees acting in con
73. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994); see supra text accompanying
note 62 (summarizing facts of the Pitchell case).
74. United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2006).
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 34-35 (finding no evidence that Giordano told the girls he was mayor in
order to get them to perform the sex acts).
77. Id. at 36 n.3.
78. Id. at 47.
79. See United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 141-45 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006).
80. Id. at 130 (majority opinion) (Temple was decided on May 1, 2006); Gior
dano, 442 F.3d at 30 (Giordano was decided on March 3, 2006).
81. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 141 (Wesley, J., concurring).
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nection with Internal Revenue laws. 82 Section 7214(a) provides in
relevant part:
(a) Unlawful acts of revenue officers or agents. -Any officer or
employee of the United States acting in connection with any rev
enue law of the United States
(1) who is guilty of any extortion or willful oppression under
color of law;
shaH be dismissed from office or discharged from employment
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both .... The
court also shall render judgment against the said officer or em
ployee for the amount of damages sustained in favor of the party
injured, to be collected by execution. 83
Eva Temple was charged and convicted under this section of
the statute. 84 The next section examines the legislative history and
judicial interpretations of § 7214(a) in order to provide an under
standing of its purpose and context.

A.

Legislative History and Purpose of § 7214(a)

The language of what is now § 7214(a) first appeared in the
U.S. Code in 1868 as part of An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled
Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other Purposes. 85 At that time, fed
82. 26 U.s.c § 7214(a) (2000). Section 7214 contains three subsections: (a), (b),
and (c). Subsection (b) provides penalties for revenue officers having a direct or indi
rect interest in the manufacture of alcohol or tobacco. Id. § 7214(b). Subsection (c) is a
cross reference to a repealed statute. Id. § 7214(c); S. REP. No. 85-2090, at 275 (1958),
as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.CA.N. 4395, 4395-97. Subsections (b) and (c) are of no
consequence to the topic of this Note and will not be discussed further.
83. 26 U.S.C § 7214(a).
84. Temple, 447 F.3d at 134 (majority opinion). Subsection (1) is only the first of
nine enumerated offenses under § 7214(a). Further offenses include: knowingly de
manding "sums greater than are authorized by law"; knowingly receiving "fees" or
"gifts" for the performance of duty or as "compromise, adjustment, or settlement of any
... alleged violation of law"; failing to perform a duty of office with the intent to avoid
application of Title 26; conspiring to or knowingly enabling another to "defraud the
United States"; making a fraudulent entry in a book or statement; and failing to report
knowledge of a violation of a revenue law. 26 U.S.C § 7214(a)(2)-(9). However, this
Note focuses solely on the first offense in § 7214(a), the only one that requires action to
be taken "under the color of law."
85. An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other Pur
poses, ch. 186, § 98, 15 Stat. 125,165 (1868) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a». The text
of § 7214(a)(1) has changed very little in the 140 years since its enactment. Temple, 447
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eral taxation was still in its early stages of development. 86 In 1862,
in order to finance the Civil War, President Lincoln signed a law
creating the first income tax. 87 This law also created the office of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and granted "the Commis
sioner the power to assess, levy, and collect taxes, and the right to
enforce the law through seizure and prosecution. "88 The law al
lowed for the assignment of a collector, assessor, and deputies in
each of 185 districts in the country to assist the Commissioner in
carrying out his responsibilities. 89 By January of 1863, a total of
3882 persons had been appointed to these positions.9°
By 1868, taxation of distilled spirits and tobacco had become
the federal government's main source of revenue, providing almost
ninety percent of the country's income.91 Therefore, Congress took
quick action when it discovered widespread fraud in the collection
of taxes on distilled spirits. 92 On January 7, 1868, Representative
Robert C. Schenck of Ohio, representing the Committee of Ways
and Means, informed the House that because "such enormous
frauds ha[d] been committed," in the previous year alone, the gov
ernment had lost $70,000,000 in revenue from the distilled spirits
tax. 93 Representative Schenck reported that the primary reason
this fraud had been achieved was:
F.3d at 143 n.4 (Wesley, J., concurring) ("The language of modern day 26 U.S.c.
§ 7214(a)(1) is almost identical to its original, 1868, formulation ....").
86. Because the United States revolution against England was caused, in part, by
a dispute over taxes, there was great reluctance to give taxation power to the central
government of the new country. THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION: INTERNAL REVE·
NUE, 1862-1963, at 16 (Lillian Doris ed., 1963) [hereinafter AMERICAN WAY]; see also
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION: HISTORY OF TAXATION,
ORGANIZATION OF THE IRS, FUNcnONS WITHIN THE IRS (1990) [hereinafter HISTORY
OF TAXATION]. The first federal tax was not levied until 1791 and only on particular
goods.
87. AMERICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 19. A few earlier attempts at taxation
were primarily taxes on commodities, like alcohol and slaves, or sales taxes, but not on
income. Id. at 17-18.
88. [d. at 31; HISTORY OF TAXATION, supra note 86.
89. AMERICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 32.
90. [d.
91. [d. at 19. The 1862 Act creating income tax originally permitted tax collection
from a greater variety of sources but Congress eliminated many of them at the end of
the Civil War. Id.
92. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364, 364-66, 380-450 (1868).
93. See id. at 364. Specifically, Representative Schenck reported that, based on
the known amount of whiskey production, at least $100,000,000 a year should have been
collected through the distilled spirits tax, but in fact the government was receiving less
than $30,000,000 each year. Id. This was a huge amount of money in 1868. If the same
fraud occurred in 2007, the government would have lost $1,078,031,783.18. See The
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the want of integrity, character, and honesty in the various
subordinate agents of the Government scattered throughout the
country who are charged with the collection of the revenues ....
[T]here is no fraud committed in ... the tax upon distilled spirits
... which would materially affect the revenue in any instance,
except it be done with the connivance of some official, except it
be by collusion between him and the party interested in the
fraud. The reason is this: instead of men being selected because
of their character, capacity and fitness ... they are selected for
other causes, upon recommendations based upon other reasons
in too many cases. 94

Because the country was losing so much money, Congress
passed an emergency measure in January of 1868 to address fraud
by changing the process of tax assessment on spirits. 95 Meanwhile,
the Committee of Ways and Means continued to work on a larger
bill addressing general problems within the internal revenue
system. 96
This larger bill, introduced in June of 1868, included the lan
guage of what would become § 7214(a). It provided "[t]hat if any
officer or agent appointed and acting under the authority of any rev
enue law of the United States shall be guilty of any extortion or
willful oppression, under color of law" he would be dismissed from
office and found guilty of a misdemeanor. 97 The penalties for con
viction under this section included a fine between $1000 and $5000
and imprisonment of at least six months, but not more than three
years.98 This provision passed through the Senate without amend
ment99 and was signed into law by President Andrew Johnson on
July 28, 1868.100
Since 1868, the only substantive change to the language of
§ 7214(a) occurred with the 1954 recodification of the Internal Rev
enue Code.lOl The 1954 Code increased the penalties for offenses
Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.comlinflation! (last visited Mar. 15, 2009)
(enter initial amount $70,000,000, initial year 1868, final year 2007).
94. CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1868).
95. Id. at 364-66.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 3503 (emphasis added).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 3772.
100. Id. at 4334-35, 4381.
101. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7214, 68A Stat. 3, 856 (1954) (codi
fied at 26 U.S.C. § 7214 (2000». Prior to 1954, the original 1868 Act went through two
other recodifications-neither of which made any substantive changes to the language
of the Act. See Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 4047(e), 53 Stat. 1,497 (1939)

2009]

"UNDER COLOR OF" INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS

131

by revenue employees, capping the fines at $10,000 and the possible
prison sentence at five years. 102 More importantly, Congress
changed the preamble of the statute, broadening its applicability to
reach "any officer or employee of the United States acting in con
nection with any revenue law," rather than "any officer or agent ap
pointed and acting under the authority of any revenue law," as the
statute originally read.103 Though the House and Senate reports do
not discuss the reason for this change,104 the new language allows
all federal employees, not just those employed by the IRS,105 to be
prosecuted under the statute if they act in connection with an Inter
nal Revenue law.1 06 The language of § 7214(a) in the most recent
publication of the Code is identical to the language of the 1954
(changing the location, but not the effect of the Act's language in the Code); Revised
Statutes § 3196, 1 Rev. Stat. 609 (1875) (rearranging the last two sentences of the Act);
see also H.R. REP. No. 76-6, at 1-3 (1939) (noting that the 1939 Code merely relocated
the language of the 1868 Act into Subtitle E, Personnel Procedures, § 4047, Penalties of
the Internal Revenue Code, but did not change the effect of the law). Despite the
relocation and minor changes to language in these three recodifications, present-day
§ 7214(a) is still very similar to the original language of the statute in 1868. Compare 26
U.S.c. § 7214(a), with An Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for
Other Purposes, ch. 186, § 98, 15 Stat. 125,165 (1868) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a)
(2000)).
102. Compare with penalties in the original bill discussed supra in text accompa
nying note 98. The reason for this change was to make IRS employee penalties "corre
spond to the penalties imposed in the case of offenses by taxpayers generally." STAFF
OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 830 CONG., SUMMARY OF H.R. 8300:
THE PROPOSED INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REP
RESENTATIVES 85 (Comm. Print 1954). The penalties described above were the same
for all taxpayer offenses under the new code. Id.
103. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 287 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017,
4575 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 329 (1954), reprinted in 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5254-55 (second and fourth emphasis added); see supra text accom
panying note 97 (quoting language of original Act).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 83-1337; S. REp. No 83-1622.
105. The meaning of "officer or employee of the United States" is plain. It in
cludes any individual employed by the federal government, from the president to a
postal worker. In theory, after 1954, an individual need not be employed specifically by
the IRS to be subject to the provisions of § 7214(a). See Internal Revenue Code of
1954, § 7214 (reading "any ... employee of the United States").
106. See United States v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31-32 (7th Cir. 1968). The only
other changes in the 1954 recodification altered the specific offenses so that each ex
pressly requires knowledge or intent of the actor as part of the criminal conduct, and
completely removed subdivision (7) of § 4047(e) of the 1939 Code, which provided an
offense where the employee acted negligently. H.R. REP. No. 83-1337; S. REp. No. 83
1622. These changes were made to ensure that offenses under this statute involve some
intentional misconduct "as distinguished from the mere negligent or other improper
conduct of an employee, not involving criminal intent, which could continue to be han
died ... by reprimand or dismissal or other action under the civil service laws." H.R.
REp. No. 83-1337, at 287.
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recodification.107 Today, as long as the individual is employed by
the federal government and has acted in connection with a revenue
law, she is subject to liability for engaging in any of the enumerated
offenses of § 7214(a).108
B.

Judicial Interpretation of § 7214(a)

Though the language of § 7214(a) has been in force since 1868,
it has not received much judicial attention. 109 The Supreme Court
has referenced the statute in only two reported decisions, neither of
which addresses the substance of § 7214(a).110 However, lower fed
eral court decisions interpreting this statute have highlighted three
important functions of § 7214(a): to set a standard of conduct for
government employees; to regulate action taken in connection with
revenue laws; and to provide a criminal cause of action against em
ployees who abuse their authority.
1.

High Standard of Conduct for Government Employees

Congress enacted § 7214(a) to remedy the widespread miscon
duct of Internal Revenue agents by defining conduct for which
agents would be penalized.1 11 In doing so, Congress effectively cre
ated a code of conduct for Internal Revenue agents. This code
holds employees of the government to a higher standard of conduct
than persons employed by private entities. H2 An early interpreta
tion of § 7214(a)113 recognized that the statute provided more se
vere punishment for an officer of the government because it is the
107. Compare 26 U.S.c. § 7214 (2000), with Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch.
75, § 7214, 68A Stat. 3, 856 (1954).
108. Cf United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. 398,409-10 (1999) (dis
cussing § 7214 as part of an overall regulatory scheme to prevent "self-enriching ac
tions" by government employees).
109. A search of Westlaw revealed only 114 federal court opinions over a fifty
year period, 1957-2007, that even mention 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a). (Search op("26 U.S.c."
Is "7214(a)") in District Court and Federal Appeals Court combined databases) (last
searched October 10, 2008).
110. Sun-Diamond Growers, 526 U.S. at 410 (referencing § 7214(a)(9) only as
part of an overall statutory scheme against bribery of federal officials); Standefer v.
United States, 447 U.S. 10, 11-14 (1980) (reviewing conviction of an individual for aid
ing and abetting an IRS agent in accepting gifts; the agent was acquitted of charges of
accepting gifts in violation of § 7214(a)(2».
111. See discussion infra notes 191-195 and accompanying text.
112. See United States v. McDonald, 26 F. Cas. 1085, 1085 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876)
(No. 15,670) (holding that, unlike "private individual[s]," government officials have a
"special[,] honorable obligation to protect the government" and thus "are held to a
more rigid [standard of] accountability").
113. [d. (interpreting Revised Statute § 3169, a precursor to the modern § 7214).
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duty of the officer to protect the government, and certainly not to
commit offenses against it himself.l 14 Significantly, the court stated:
"those who have a trust reposed in them, are held to a more rigid
accountability than others, and a violation of that trust is punished
more severly [sic] when committed by them than where no such
special trust is reposed."1l5
This theme is repeated in modern cases interpreting § 7214(a),
such as United States v. Stern. 116 In Stern, the Second Circuit up
held the conviction of an Internal Revenue employee under
§ 7214(a) for making a false statement to the IRS during its audit of
his personal tax returns. 117 In affirming Stern's conviction under
§ 7214(a)(7), the court held, in no uncertain terms, that "[s]ection
7214 imposes sanctions on revenue agents for departures from the
high standards of conduct demanded of those holding that of
fice."118 As an employee of the IRS, Stern violated the high stan
dard of conduct expected of him by intentionally providing false
information to the IRS.1 19
The judicial interpretation of § 7214(a), as a standard for be
havior of federal employees, comports with the intent of the draft
ers to impose sanctions on agents who acted without integrity.120
The standard of conduct established by § 7214(a) has endured for
the past 130 years.1 21 Not only has it survived, but Congress broad
ened its applicability in 1954 to reach a larger group of federal
employees.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. United States v. Stern, 418 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1969); see also Hartline v.
Clary, 141 F. Supp. 151,158 (E.D.S.C. 1956) (holding that § 4047(e), the identical pre
cursor to § 7214(a), imposed a statutory duty on Internal Revenue agents to perform
not only their duties under the law but to act in all matters relating to Internal Revenue
laws and regulations).
117. Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99.
118. Id. at 199.
119. The court also found it unimportant that, in relation to the audit of his per
sonal finances, Stern was acting outside the scope of his employment at the IRS when
he made the false statement. Id.
120. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1868); discussion supra text
accompanying notes 92-95. This judicial interpretation is further supported by policies
of the IRS itself that seek to "assure the maintenance of the highest standards of hon
esty, integrity, loyalty, security, and conduct among Service employees." AMERICAN
WAY, supra note 86, at 204.
121. See supra notes 101-108 and accompanying text (noting that the language of
§ 7214(a) has remained virtually unchanged since 1868).
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Action "in Connection with Revenue Laws"

The 1954 recodification of the Internal Revenue Code
amended § 7214(a) to apply to "any officer or employee of the
United States," acting "in connection with" a revenue law.1 22 The
preamble of § 7214(a) plainly designates the group that is subject to
its provisions: employees of the United States.1 23 Further,
§ 7214(a) does not require that the employee act under the author
ity of a revenue law, or in the course of his employment duties, but
only that he act in connection with a revenue law of the United
States.1 24
Though this requirement was clear from the revised language
of § 7214(a), it did represent a change from the earlier version of
the statute,125 and defendants continued to argue that the statute
only applied to actions taken in the performance of some official
duty under the revenue laws. 126 For example, in United States v.
Stern, after being charged under § 7214(a) for making a false state
ment to the IRS, Stern argued that he was acting as a private citi
zen, not in his capacity as an IRS employee, when he made the
statement.1 27 However, the court found it irrelevant that the mis
122. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 75, § 7214, 68A Stat. 3, 856 (1954) (codi
fied at 26 U.S.C § 7214 (2000)) (emphasis added); H. R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 287
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.CA.N. 4017, 4575 (noting the specific. words and
phrases changed by the 1954 Act).
123. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199 ("The preamble merely designates generally which
Government employees are under the section.").
124. 26 U.S.C § 7214(a) (2000) ("Any officer or employee of the United States
acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States ...."). Section 7214
"does not require that [the defendant) be acting under authority of the revenue laws."
United States v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1968); see infra note 136 and accom
panying text.
125. See Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1897) (holding that
under Revised Statute § 3169, an earlier version of § 7214, prosecution against a Trea
sury Department customs inspector could not be upheld because the statute applied
only to officers or agents "appointed and acting under the authority of any revenue
law"). In this case, the inspector was (1) not appointed under a revenue law but under
acts of Congress to regulate unlawful entry of Chinese into the United States; and (2)
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, that he was to enforce, had no relation to Internal Reve
nue laws. Id.; see also supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (discussing the one
substantive language change to § 7214(a) in 1954).
126. See Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99 (arguing that § 7214(a) only operates where the
acts were committed in the performance of a revenue officer's duties); Johnson, 398
F.2d at 31 (arguing that § 7214(a) does not apply where the activities in question were
performed after hours and outside of his duties as an IRS employee).
127. Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99.
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conduct occurred outside of the officer's official duties, as long as it
occurred while the wrongdoer was a revenue agent. 128
In Stern, the Second Circuit also used principles of statutory
interpretation to support its construction of § 7214(a)(7).129 First, it
relied on the presumption against redundancy:13o because several
subsections of § 7214(a) specifically provided that the wrongful act
must be committed in the course of official duties, it would be re
dundant to read that language into the preamble. l3l Second, the
court noted that three other provisions of § 7214(a) that had con
tained a "performance of duty" requirement in an earlier version of
the statute retained that language in the current version, and, there
fore, Congress's omission of this phrase from subsection (7) must
have been intentional.1 32 Consequently, the Court held that
§ 7214(a) was intended to reach activities in connection with reve
nue laws, whether or not in the course of official duties. As a result,
by providing a false statement to the IRS regarding his personal
finances, Stern was acting in connection with a revenue law under
the meaning of the statute, even though he was not acting in the
course of his duties for the IRS.133
Likewise, in 1968, Internal Revenue employee Thomas John
son was convicted of willfully aiding the preparation of materially
false income tax returns under § 7214(a)(4).134 Despite the fact
that preparing tax returns was not part of Johnson's official du
ties,135 the court sustained his conviction, stating: "He was charged
with acting in connection with the revenue laws and he was so act
ing in preparing returns even if he did so away from his office and
after regular working hours."136 This case also demonstrates that
128. Id.
129. Id. at 199.
130. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY IN·
TERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 84-86 (2002) (statutes should
be construed so that every word is valuable and not redundant or duplicative); see also
infra notes 206-207 and accompanying text (discussing why it is correct to apply the
principle against redundancy to § 7214).
131. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199; see also 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a)(2) (2000) (receiving fees
for the performance of any duty); id. § 7214 (a)(3) (failing to perform any duty with the
intent to defeat IRS laws).
132. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199.
133. Id. at 198-99.
134. United States v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 30 (7th Cir. 1968).
135. Id. (as an examiner for the IRS, Johnson was responsible for checking ques
tionable exemptions and supervising junior personnel).
136. Id. at 31 (emphasis added).
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courts have freely applied § 7214(a) to actions of federal employees
taken in a purely personal capacity.
3.

Section 7214(a) Does Not Create a Private Cause of
Action

The final clause of § 7214(a) sets forth criminal penalties for an
offense under the statute.137 It also provides that the court "shall
render judgment against the ... employee for the amount of dam
ages sustained in favor of the party injured."138 This language has
been interpreted to mean that damages are not available to the in
jured party until after a criminal conviction has been obtained
under this section,139 As recently as 2007, the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit dismissed complaints under several provisions of
§ 7214(a), holding that it is a "criminal statute[] that do[es] not pro
vide for a private right of action and [is] not enforceable through a
civil action."140
The foregoing cases summarize the current judicial construc
tion of § 7214(a) as a criminal penalty against federal government
employees who, when acting in connection with revenue laws of the
United States, breach the high standard of conduct imposed on
them by virtue of their employment.
C.

"Under Color of Law" in § 7214(a): United States v. Deaver

United States v. Deaver sets out jury instructions in the first
known trial to construe the language of § 7214(a)(1).141 Though
137. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) (2000) (dismissal from office and fines of up to $10,000,
up to five years in prison, or both).
138. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a).
139. United States v. Overton, 44 F. App'x 932, 933-34 (10th Cir. 2002) (dis
missing taxpayer's suit under § 7214(a) because taxpayers cannot receive damages until
criminal conviction under § 7214(a) has been obtained); Brunwasser v. Jacob, 453 F.
Supp. 567, 572-73 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (dismissing civil suit for damages as invalid cause of
action under § 7214(a»; see also Detwiler v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 695, 700 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) ("[I]t is the intent of Congress that injury to individuals resulting from 'willful
oppression under color of law' [by] officers or employees of the Revenue Service are to
be redressed by criminal action brought by the United States. Accordingly, 26 U.S.c.
§ 7214 has no relevancy in this suit" by a private individuaL).
140. ANDREWS V. HEATON, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a
father's complaints under § 7214(a)(1), (2), (7), and (8) resulting from an investigation
by the Department of Human Services).
141. United States v. Deaver, 14 F. 595, 596-603 (W.D.N.C. 1882). Unfortu
nately, this opinion only contains jury instructions and gives neither the facts of the case
nor its outcome. Id.
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this opinion is over a century 01d,142 it is the only case on record to
discuss the application of the phrase "under color of law" in the
context of § 7214(a) prior to the Temple decision. 143 In Deaver, the
judge instructed the jury that officers of the revenue service "can
not rightfully do any act which is not authorized by law, under color
of office."144 Therefore, the judge instructed that if the jury found
that the defendant acted without, or in excess of his actual authority,
under the guise of carrying out his official duties, then the defen
dant would be guilty of action "under color of law."145 The judge in
Deaver defined· the expression "under color of law" in the same
way as it is defined in Classic 146 -action taken under the deceptive
appearance of some state authority-but does not give his reason
ing for that definition or the method by which it should be applied.
The legislative history and cases discussed in this Part provide
a comprehensive interpretation of the meaning and purpose of
§ 7214(a) generally. However, this Part also reveals a lack of con
gressional or judicial discussion of the meaning of the phrase
"under color of law" or how that phrase should be applied in
§ 7214(a) cases. It is against this backdrop that the Temple case was
decided.
III.

THE TEMPLE DECISION

The Temple case provides a factual context in which to ex
amine whether a victim's subjective perceptions should be consid
ered in a § 7214(a) "under color of law" analysis. After being
arrested at work in the New York City IRS office, Temple
142. This case is still good law in the sense that it has not been expressly or im
pliedly overruled or abrogated, and has been positively cited to as recently as 2007. See
Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2606 (2007) (citing Deaver for its definition of
extortion).
143. Deaver, 14 F. at 596-601. The cases discussed supra Parts II.B.l-.2 provide
judicial interpretations of the entirety of § 7214( a) or of subsections other than (a)(1).
None of the previously discussed cases specifically interprets subsection (a)(l), which
contains the phrase "under color of law."
144. Id. at 602.
145. Id. at 599. As to count one, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant
may be found guilty if he misrepresented circumstances to his superiors to get authori
zation to use force more excessive than necessary. Id. As to count two, the jury was
instructed that the defendant could be found guilty of acting "under the color of law"
when he "destroy[ed] the still of John Wortman" if he did so prior to a judicial decree
condemning the property and thus was "without authority of law" to destroy it. Id. at
600 (emphasis added). Finally, on count three, the jury could find the defendant guilty
if it found that he collected sums before they were due, again acting under the appear
ance of but without authority of law. Id. at 601.
146. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).
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threatened to initiate audits of the arresting officers' personal tax
returns. 147 Having witnessed Temple's belligerent and threatening
behavior,148 the detectives were concerned that she might carry out
these threats and they reported her actions to the U.S. Treasury
Department.1 49 Their report resulted in Temple's prosecution
under § 7214(a).150
Though Temple was convicted by a jury, the district court judge
granted her motion for acquittal, holding that there was insufficient
evidence for the jury to have concluded that she acted "under color
of law."151 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
unanimously reinstated Temple's conviction, holding that there was
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that she acted
"under color of law."152 However, while the judges were unani
mous in the result, the majority and concurrence disagreed as to
whether "under color of law" should be measured subjectively or
objectively.
A.

The Majority Opinion

The majority, acknowledging that this was a case of first im
pression under § 7214(a), began its analysis by looking at § 242 and
§ 1983 case law.1 53 It stated that "tests established [in § 242 and
§ 1983 cases] are helpful in determining whether an action is taken
under color of federal law."154 The court adopted the civil rights
statutes' definition of "under color of law": "[0 ]ne who abuses a
position given to him or her by the government is said to act under
color of law."155
147. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 132-33 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 495 (2006).
148. See id. at 132-33. Temple began to flail and curse at the detectives as they
escorted her out of the IRS building. [d. She attempted to get out of the squad car. Id.
After being handcuffed, she continued to curse at the detectives and was yelling that
this was a racial conspiracy against her. Id. She kicked Detective Montes as he rode
with her in the back of the car and continued the physical and verbal abuse at the police
station. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 134.
151. Id. at 135 (citing United States v. Temple, 342 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), rev'd, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006)).
152. See id. at 130.
153. Id. at 137-38.
154. Id. The court acknowledged that §§ 242 and 1983 dealt with action under
the color of state law but found them helpful in its analysis nonetheless. Id.
155. Id. at 138 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1988)); see supra Part
I.A. (reviewing the Court's construction of "under color of law" in §§ 242 and 1983).
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Once it ascertained the meaning of "under color of law," the
majority applied the phrase to the specific facts of the Temple case.
Though the majority never expressly stated that it was relying on
the detectives' subjective perceptions to determine that Temple ac
ted "under color of law," this fact can be inferred from the opinion.
The majority looked at Temple's authority as it was perceived by
the detectives at the time the threats were made. 156 The majority
explicitly rejected the district court's contention that the detectives
should not have believed Temple's threats because of facts that
came to light after the threats were made. 157 Instead, the court held
that because the detectives had no reason to doubt that Temple
would follow through at the time the threats were made, the detec
tives' subjective impression that they would be audited demon
strated a misuse of authority by Temple. 158
Further, the majority justified its conclusion by noting that in
Giordano, the victims' subjective belief in their attacker's state au
thority, even without a specific threat under the guise of that au
thority, was sufficient to determine that he acted "under color of
law."159 The majority also noted that subjecting Temple to penal
ties under § 7214(a) was consistent with the purpose of the statute
to "'impose[ ] sanctions on revenue agents for departure[ ] from the
high standards of conduct demanded by those holding that
office.' "160

B.

The Concurring Opinion

The concurrence expressed concern that the majority opinion
would be read to allow a victim's subjective perception of authority
to control an "under color of law" analysis, particularly when read
156. See Temple, 447 F.3d at 138.
157. Id. at 138-39. The district court held that a reasonable jury could not find
that Temple had acted under the color of law because she did not in fact have the ability
to initiate an audit. Temple, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 239-40. It also found that the detectives
should not have believed Temple because she made statements at the police station that
had caused the detectives to question her mental capacity. Id. at 240. However, be
cause these facts were not known to the detectives at the time Temple threatened them,
the Court of Appeals held that they had no bearing on the "under color of law" analy
sis. Temple, 447 F.3d at 138-39; see also Miller, supra note 53, at 346 (arguing that an
"under color of law" violation should be based on what is known when the wrongful act
occurs).
158. Temple, 447 F.3d at 138-39.
159. Id. at 139; see supra text accompanying notes 74-78 (reviewing the Giordano
decision).
160. Temple, 447 F.3d at 139 (quoting United States v. Stem, 418 F.2d 198, 199
(2d Cir. 1969)).
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in conjunction with the Giordano decision.1 61 Specifically, it ar
gued: "There is no basis for allowing subjective impressions, beliefs,
or fears to cloud, much less drive, color-of-Iaw analysis, and doing
so will make consistent application of color-of-Iaw statutes in this
Circuit difficult, if not impossible."162 The concern was that reli
ance on a victim's subjective belief would allow liability to attach in
the absence of any official status of the actor.1 63 The concurrence
asserted that if a defendant's position and behavior as a public offi
cial are no longer essential to determining the applicability of the
phrase "under color of law," liability under these statutes would be
unpredictable, and any distinction between official action and per
sonal pursuits would be eliminated. l64
The concurring opinion did not take issue with the majority's
adoption of the Classic definition of "under color of law," but con
tended that some objective manifestation of authority should be re
quired to render action "under color of law."165 The concurrence's
position is supported by case law, specifically Pitch ell v. Callan,166
which held that focusing on the victim's subjective reaction" 'misses
the essence'" of the "under color of law" requirement.1 67 How
ever, the concurrence relied exclusively on § 242 and § 1983 case
law to reach this conclusion and did not consider the role of subjec
tive beliefs in the context of § 7214(a).1 68
By failing to consider the history and purpose of § 7214(a) and
the judicial interpretations of other provisions of § 7214(a), the con
currence did not accurately apply the phrase "under color of law"
in the context of § 7214(a). The last section of this Note argues
that, given the particular purpose of § 7214(a), it is appropriate to
161. Id. at 141 (Wesley, J., concurring).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 144. See generally supra Part I.A.l (reviewing early interpretations of
the phrase "under color of law" that required an actor to have some connection to the
state to be held liable for the wrongful conduct under §§ 242 and 1983).
164. Temple, 447 F.3d at 142 (Wesley, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 141 ("I do not quarrel with much of the majority opinion, including
[the conclusion that Temple acted "under color of law"], but I would hold that Temple's
threats were under the color of law without regard to the detectives' subjective beliefs
or fears. ").
166. Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994).
167. Temple, 447 F.3d at 144 (Wesley, J., concurring) (quoting Pitchell, 13 F.3d at
549).
168. Id. at 143-44. The concurring opinion does acknowledge that there is little
case law regarding § 7214(a)(I) and that the language of § 7214(a) has remained un
changed since 1868, but it does not look into the purpose of the statute any further. See
id.
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consider the subjective view of the victim in a § 7214(a) "under
color of law" analysis.
IV.

SUBJECfIVE ANALYSIS IS ApPROPRIATE UNDER § 7214

The key issue identified by the Temple concurrence is whether,
when considering a statute that requires action to be taken "under
color of law," courts should use an objective or subjective standard
to measure the requisite misuse of authority.1 69 This Analysis ar
gues that applying a subjective standard of "under color of law" in
§ 7214(a) cases achieves a result consistent with the purposes of the
statute and does not cause the problems associated with reliance on
a subjective standard in § 242 and § 1983 casesPo While the phrase
"under color of law" can be defined consistently across statutes in
which it appears, it should be applied in light of the unique pur
poses of the statute before the court. l7l As it is used in § 7214(a),
"under color of law" may be defined consistently with §§ 242 and
1983 as a misuse of power made possible because the actor has au
thority of law, but unlike §§ 242 and 1983, can be applied using a
purely subjective measure. Further, this Analysis contends that the
concerns raised by the concurring opinion in Temple are misplaced
because they focus on the problems caused by using a purely sub
jective measure of "under color of law" in § 242 and § 1983 cases,
169. See id. at 141; see also Libby, supra note 9 (highlighting the fact that this
debate over the use of an objective or subjective standard is common among courts
considering any statute containing the phrase "under color of law").
170. The author does not mean to suggest that the courts must use an exclusively
subjective standard in § 7214. A purely objective standard, or some combination of
objective and subjective measures could also theoretically satisfy the purposes of
§ 7214(a). However, because this Note is focused on rebutting the contention of the
Temple concurrence that a purely subjective standard should never be used, the focus of
this Analysis will be on the suitability of applying a subjective standard.
171. There are two concepts of statutory interpretation that are essential to this
Analysis. The first is that courts have a duty to both interpret and apply statutes in light
of the statute's particular goals, and that there is a difference between these two func
tions. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING LEGIS
LATIVE HISTORY: A RE-EvALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 37-39 (1989) [hereinafter USING AND MISUSING LEGIS
LATIVE HISTORY]. The second concept is that every statute has an individualized his
tory and purpose, and courts must recognize the unique context of the statute they are
interpreting, and then apply it in a way that achieves that purpose. See ABNER J.
MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND TIlE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1997); Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Cate
gory, 37 CAN. B. REV. 535, 549-51 (1959); infra notes 189-195 and accompanying text
(discussing contextualism and examining the context and purpose of § 7214(a»; see gen
erally BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130 (discussing the distinction between application
and interpretation).
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and fail to recognize that the same problems do not exist in the
context of § 7214(a).172
A.

Interpretation of "Under Color of Law" in § 7214(a)

When deciding any case involving a statute, it is the court's
duty to both interpret and apply the statutory language. 173 Though
the distinction between interpretation and application is subtle, it is
vital to the constitutional principle of separation of powers.174 In
terpretation seeks to ascertain the actual meaning of the statute as
manifested by the text,175 without reference to any particular set of
172. This phenomenon of blindly transporting the application of a concept from
one legal context to another without considering the difference in contexts has been
succinctly described by one scholar as the "fallacy of the transplanted category." See
Hancock, supra note 171. Tracing a line of cases interpreting the word "consent," Han
cock points out that even where a single word is always used in reference to the same
subject matter (with consent, in "reference to ... the state of a person's mind in relation
to a particular transaction"), because of the diverse policy goals of the different statutes
in which the word appears, it is illogical to assume that the phrase will always have the
same scope. Id. at 549-51 ("[T]he meaning of a legal term will usually vary according to
the legal result involved ...."). Likewise, the phrase "under color of law" is used in
reference to the same subject matter-some perceived abuse of government author
ity-in both the civil rights statutes and § 7214. However, because the situation in
which that abuse of authority occurs varies between the statutes, so too should the
application of the phrase "under color of law."
173. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 11 ("It is the courts' duty to determine
the legislative intent and give it effect."); USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 171, at 37-39.
174. USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39-40; see
also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 3 (recognizing a distinction between inter
pretation and application, the authors note that "[c]areful interpretation is important to
the larger venture of using statutes"). As Chief Justice Marshall stated: "It is the pecu
liar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society;
the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of
other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (emphasis
added). However, the interpretation and application processes are often combined by
courts, which ask only whether the legislature intended the statute to apply in this way.
See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 6. Searching for the legislature's intended appli
cation of a statute impermissibly expands the role of the legislature by giving it power
to apply a statute, a power granted solely to the judiciary in Article III of the Constitu
tion. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39.
175. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 21-23
(discussing the differences between actual meaning and intended meaning). Actual
meaning is the meaning that the words of the statute convey to a typical reader. Id. at
21. This approach focuses on the legislative intent as it is objectively manifested in the
text of the law and recognizes that it is the text of the statute that has to be agreed on by
both houses of the legislature, as well as the president, in order for a bill to become law.
See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 13·14 (approaching legislative intent under
contract law theory, parties are held to the intent they have objectively manifested to
each other); USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 27-28.
Proponents of an actual meaning approach argue that it is "essential to stability in the
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facts,176 Courts are required to interpret a statute based on the
meaning expressed by Congress. 177 Application, on the other hand,
is the process of determining the legal consequences of the statute
on a given fact pattern.178 Because application determines the out
come of a case, this process is the sole province of the courtS.179
Before applying any statute containing "under color of law"
language, the court's duty is to determine the actual meaning of
that phrase-the meaning the legislature created in the text of the
statute.1 80 This Note does not quarrel with the Temple court's defi
nition of "under color of law" in § 7214(a) as an abuse of official
authority.1 81 Rather, it defends the court's definition as accurate in
the context of § 7214(a).
law." Id. at 35. Laws must be fixed and knowable to the public to maintain a stable,
ordered society, and the intended meaning of the legislature is "inherently less knowa
ble and fixed than actual meaning." Id. at 36. The Department of Justice makes a
convincing constitutionally based argument for the "primacy" of actual meaning. Id. at
26-37. It also demonstrates how a search for actual meaning alleviates many of the
criticisms of the use of legislative history. See id. at 79-80.
176. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 38
("[I]t is often possible to ... ascertain the actual meaning of [a] statute-without refer
ence to particular fact situations.").
177. This requirement stems from the need to preserve the separation of powers
between the legislative and judicial branches of government. See MIKVA & LANE,
supra note 171, at 4; USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at
33-34. It is universally accepted that courts should "adhere to the legislative intent" in
the process of statutory interpretation. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 11 (citing
Donajokowski v. Alpena Power Co., 596 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Mich. 1999)). There are
many criticisms of the process of ascertaining legislative intent. See, e.g., MIKVA &
LANE, supra note 171, at 29-31; USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 171, at 47-56 (both discussing the problems with use of legislative history to ascer
tain intent). However, it is a necessary evil if the courts are to fulfill their role of inter
pretation without overstepping the bounds of their constitutional powers. Further,
these criticisms can be overcome by focusing on the actual meaning of the statute rather
than the intended meaning. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 171, at 21-23.
178. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 37-38.
179. See generally id. at 39-40. The power granted to the judiciary by Article III
of the U.S. Constitution is the power to decide specific cases and controversies by ap
plying legislative rules. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Once the legislature has enacted a
statute, "its power to control the outcome of litigation ... is at an end." USING AND
MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39-40.
180. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
181. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
495 (2006). After accurately noting that this is the first case to consider the phrase
"willful oppression under color of law" in the context of § 7214(a), the majority looked
to "commonly held concepts to illuminate the phrase." Id. at 137. For the terms "will
ful" and "oppression," the court used dictionary definitions to supply their meaning.
Id. But then, for the phrase "under color of law," the court relied solely on § 242 and
§ 1983 case law to define "under color of law" in § 7214(a). [d. at 137-38. Though the
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The search for actual meaning should begin with the text of the
statute and go no further if that language is plain. 182 However,
there is no plain meaning of the phrase "under color of law" be
cause it is an idiom-its meaning cannot be ascertained from the
literal meaning of its combined elements.1 83 Alternatively, even if a
court were to argue that "under color of law" can be understood as
a metaphor 184-the phrase is still ambiguous on its face.
In a case like this, when the statute's meaning is not plain,
courts must use extrinsic evidence to put the language in context to
ascertain the actual meaning of the statute. 185 As a legislative re
sponse to a particular problem, every statute has an individualized
history and purpose. 186 To accurately interpret a statute, courts
must recognize the unique context of the statute they are consider
ing. 187 Though many different sources can be used to give context
to a statute,188 this Analysis will focus on the problem § 7214(a) was
designed to remedy and the meaning of the phrase "under color of
use of a phrase in other statutes may be a consideration in defining that phrase, it
should not be relied on to the exclusion of other methods to determine the scope of
language as it is used in a specific statute. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL
AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1942). When discussing the defini
tion of "under color of law" in the Temple case, this Note refers to the Temple court
generally, rather than distinguishing between the majority and concurring opinions be
cause both opinions adopt the same meaning of the phrase. They differ only on the
proper method of applying that definition in § 7214(a) cases.
182. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485; BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 38-40;
MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 5) ("The starting place for any search for statutory
meaning obviously must be in the language of the statute in question, for it is the lan
guage of a statute that the legislature enacts."). In the words of Chief Justice Marshall,
it is "the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature, but this intention is
to be searched for in the words which the legislature has employed to convey it."
Schooner Paulina's Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812).
183. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 21, at 616.
184. .Id. at 780 ("[A] figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting
one ... idea is used in place of another ...."); see also Winter, supra note 12, at 384-89
(analyzing "under color of law" as a metaphor).
185. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 38-39 (plain meaning rule). Statu
tory language often can be unclear "simply because the English language by its very
nature ... is an inherent breeding ground for ambiguity." Id. at 2; see also Schweg
mann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,395-97 (1951) (Jackson, J., concur
ring); MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 9-10.
186. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 1-2.
187. See HANCOCK supra note 171, at 538 (noting that judges should consider
"verbal context and ... relation to the factual problem which the statute deals with"
when interpreting a word or phrase).
188. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 19-20
(stating that context may be established narrowly by looking the words surrounding the
phrase in question, or broadly by looking at the history and circumstances of a statute's
enactment).
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law" in other statutes to demonstrate why the Temple court was
correct to define the phrase as a misuse of authority.
1.

The Problem to be Remedied by § 7214(a)

"Contextualism" is a method of statutory interpretation that
considers what was happening economically, politically, or socially
at the time a statute was enacted, as well as the way in which words
or phrases were used at that time. 189 These extrinsic factors can
help a court understand the purpose of the statute, and thus to in
terpret it in a manner consistent with that purpose. 190 The social
circumstances in 1868 and the problem Congress was attempting to
resolve by enacting § 7214(a) support the definition of "under color
of law" adopted by the Temple court.
In 1868, Congress was presented with evidence that Internal
Revenue agents across the country were misusing, or acting beyond
the scope of, their actual authority as agents.191 Widespread alco
hol tax fraud was occurring because of Internal Revenue agents'
lack of integrity and their willingness to cooperate with whiskey
rings. 192 Revenue agents were also unlawfully seizing property
under the guise of authority and extorting settlements for tax
debts.193 This abuse of authority was rampant and apparently diffi
cult to prevent among the 3882 agents scattered across the coun
try,194 especially without any criminal penalties to deter agent
189. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 47-48; see also Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1987) (noting that the inquiry into legislative purpose requires
examination of "[t]he plain meaning of the statute's words, enlightened by their context
and the contemporaneous legislative history" as well as "the historical context of the
statute ... and the specific sequence of events leading to passage of the statute"). Leg
islative history can be used to reveal the problem a statute was intended to remedy, as
welI as the historical circumstances in which it was enacted. BROWN & BROWN, supra
note 130, at 43 ("The court [should] seek[] to identify the 'evil' ... the statute was
intended to eradicate and interpret it in a manner to accomplish that purpose.").
190. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 47-48; see also USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 67 ("Statutory meaning that might otherwise
be uncertain may take on a distinctive color through the context provided" by under
standing the legislative goaL). An understanding of the purposes of the statute will also
help the court in applying the statute. See infra Part IV.B.1.
191. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1868).
192. See id.; supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text (discussing the historical
circumstances that necessitated the enactment of § 7214).
193. See, e.g., United States V. Deaver, 14 F. 595, 599-602 (1882) (instructing the
jury on charges against a revenue officer for the destruction of a taxpayer's still under
the guise of his office, but without actual authority, and for collecting "special taxes"
that were not officialIy sanctioned).
194. AMERICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 32. The lack of technology in 1868-no
telephone, fax, e-mail, or even next-day delivery service to facilitate communication
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misconduct. 195 It was within this state of affairs that Congress
passed § 7214(a). Because the statute was created specifically to
remedy a documented abuse of authority by Internal Revenue
agents, it is logical to conclude that the phrase "under color of law"
was used to connote an abuse of authority.
In addition, there are some well-established canons of con
struction196 that, when applied to the phrase "under color of law" in
§ 7214(a), also support the definition adopted by the Temple court.
One canon is that a court should presume that if the word used has
a technical meaning or is a term of art the legislature intended that
meaning in the statute. 197 By the time the phrase "under color of
law" first appeared in American laws, it had become a term of art
understood to imply action taken by an official under the deceptive
appearance of authority.198 The jury instruction published in
United States v. Deaver demonstrates that in the 1800s, "under color
of law" was understood as a term of art.1 99
presumably allowed much agent misconduct to go unseen by supervisors in the time it
took them to physically travel to IRS outposts across the country.
195. The youth of the IRS, combined with its rapid growth and lack of organiza
tion, were probably also factors contributing to the misconduct of its agents. See AMER·
ICAN WAY, supra note 86, at 31-33; HISTORY OF TAXATION, supra note 86. In addition,
revenue agents were either appointed to the IRS based on political ties or contracted by
the government as private collectors, without regard to their character and fitness for
the job. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66, 3378-81 (1868); AMERICAN
WAY, supra note 86, at 33.
196. Courts bear a heavy burden in interpreting statutes. They ate bound to en
force the command of the legislature but are often stuck in situations where the lan
guage of a statute is ambiguous, and there is scant or unreliable legislative history
available to clarify the ambiguity. To help ease this burden, the judiciary has developed
canons of construction that function as presumptions about legislative meaning.
BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 71-74; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at
23-25 (listing numerous canons of construction used in statutory interpretation). These
canons are used by courts to "fill the void that exists when there is no other reasonable
way to know how to interpret [the language of a] statute." BROWN & BROWN, supra
note 130, at 72.
197. .Id. at 87-88. When words have "acquired a legal and technical signification
we must presume that the legislature used them in their legal and technical sense."
Deaver, 14 F. at 596·97; see also MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 25 ("Words are to
be given their common meaning, unless they are technical terms or words of art. ").
Contra Hancock, supra note 171, at 541-42 ("[T]his canon had always yielded to the
least suggestion of contrary intention.").
198. See generally Winter, supra note 12, at 323-28 (summarizing the history of
the phrase "under color of law"). Winter concludes that where Congress uses a phrase
with a technical meaning, it intends to adopt that phrase as a term of art, and this is
why there is little debate over the use of the words "under color of law" within the
legislative history of 42 U.S.c. § 1983. Id. at 384.
199. Deaver, 14 F. 595; see supra text accompanying notes 141-146 (explaining
how the judges' failure to consider the meaning of "under color of law" demonstrates a
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The judge in Deaver specifically noted that this was the court's
first occasion to interpret § 7214(a) and for that reason provided
the jury with a thorough explanation of the terms "willful" and "op
pression."20o Yet he did not offer any definition of the phrase
"under color of law."201 This lack of explanation supports the infer
ence that "under color of law" had a commonly understood mean
ing that the jury would grasp without further instruction. 202
Because at the time § 7214(a) was drafted, the phrase "under color
of law" was a commonly known term of art referring to action
taken under the deceptive appearance of authority, the Temple
court was correct to assume that the legislature used the phrase in
that sense.
Another canon of statutory interpretation recognizes that
there is significance in the words that Congress did not use. 203 The
logic of this approach is that the use of specific words creates a
negative implication, namely that other words were avoided for a
reason. 204 Applying this principle to § 7214(a), if Congress meant
to create an offense for the willful oppression of another with actual
authority, it would have used the words "actual authority." It is
significant that Congress chose the term "under color of law,"
knowing that it had a technical meaning that relied on the appear
ance of authority, but not actual authority. In § 7214(a), Congress's
use of a phrase implying abuse of apparent authority must exclude
from the reach of that statute action properly taken within the
bounds of authority. This principle of negative implication further

common understanding of the phrase). Deaver was decided in 1882, only fifteen years
after § 7214(a) was enacted. Deaver, 14 F. 595.
200. Id. at 597-99. Section 7214(a) penalizes actors who are guilty of "willful op
pression under color of law." 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a)(1) (2000).
201. Deaver, 14 F. at 595-96.
202. The fact that Congress did not debate the use or meaning of the phrase in
enacting § 7214 may also evidence that it was considered a term of art with an undis
puted meaning. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66, 3378-81 (1868) (dem
onstrating no debate over the phrase "under color of law"). However, it is also possible
that the phrase was simply not discussed because the provisions of § 7214(a) were not
the main focus of the bill the committee was instructed to draft. See id. at 3379. Argua
bly, this phrase may have slipped through unnoticed in the midst of more heated argu
ments over the appropriate tax rate on distilled liquor. See id. at 3378-80, 3397-99.
203. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 78-81. This principle is also em
bodied in the phrase, expressio un ius est exclusio alterius-the expression of one thing
implies the exclusion of others. See id. at 81.
204. Id. at 78-81.
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confirms that Congress intended § 7214(a) to apply to action that
constituted an abuse or misuse of authority.20s
Finally, the principle against surplusage or redundancy assumes
that Congress intended each word of the statute to have meaning
and that unnecessary words would have been filtered out by the
time the statute was enacted. 206 Applying that principle, because
the original language of § 7214(a) required that action be taken
"under the authority of any revenue law of the United States,"207
"under color of law" must have a meaning other than actual author
ity. It would be redundant to interpret the phrase "under color of
law" to mean actual authority of law where the drafters expressly
required action under authority of law in the language of the
preamble.
The social circumstances in which the statute was drafted, com
bined with the foregoing canons of construction, support the Tem
ple court's definition of "under color of law" in the context of
§ 7214(a) as an abuse of authority. In addition, because the defini
tion of "under color of law" adopted in Temple was created by, and
is still applied to, §§ 242 and 1983, Temple preserves a consistent
meaning of the phrase "under color of law" across all statutes. By
adopting the same meaning as in §§ 242 and 1983, the court has
adhered to the principle of construction that statutes on the same
subject be read consistently with one another,208 and has also ad
dressed one of the concurring opinion's main concerns. 209
It is appropriate that §§ 242, 1983, and 7214 should all employ
the same definition of "under color of law" because they were each
designed to remedy some type of official misconduct. 210 However,
205. Contra Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,212-23 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissent
ing) (arguing that "under color of law" means with actual authority of law), overruled in
part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
206. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 130, at 84-86; MIKVA & LANE, supra note
171, at 24.
207. Act Imposing Taxes on Distilled Spirits and Tobacco, and for Other Pur
poses, ch. 186, § 98, 15 Stat. 125, 165 (1868) (codified at 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) (2000»
(emphasis added).
208. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 171, at 24 ("Statutes that relate to the same
subject matter ... are to be construed together.").
209. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir. 2006) (Wesley, J., concur
ring) ("[A ]llowing subjective impressions, beliefs, or fears to ... drive [the] color-of-Iaw
analysis ... will make consistent application of color-of-Iaw statutes ... difficult."), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 495 (2006).
210. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 23, at 2090-92 ("[T]he purpose of section 1983 is
to deter local actors from using their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights, and to provide relief if that deterrence fails." (citing Wyatt v. Cole,
504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992»).
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It IS on the proper method of applying "under color of law" in
§ 7214(a) that the Temple majority and concurrence differ. The
majority, by considering the victims' subjective reactions to Tem
ple's conduct, correctly applied the phrase "under color of law" in a
manner that achieves the purposes of § 7214(a). The concurrence,
on the other hand, erred in arguing that subjective beliefs should
not be considered in § 7214(a) because of the problems that arise
using a subjective measure in the context of §§ 242 and 1983.
B. Application of "Under Color of Law" in § 7214(a)
This Note argues that applying the phrase "under color of law"
in § 7214(a) in the same way it is applied in civil rights statutes is
incorrect. To be sure, it is tempting, and indeed common, to as
sume that a phrase that appears in mUltiple legal rules has the same
scope in each of them. 211 But to give in to that temptation, as the
Temple concurrence has done, "has all the tenacity of original sin
and must constantly be guarded against."212 The scope of any legal
term is developed through decisions influenced by policy considera
tions relevant to the specific case before the court.2 13 To blindly
apply that term the same way "in a different legal context where a
different legal result is [at] issue" is improper and may actually frus
trate the policies behind the statute. 214 In order to correctly apply a
statute, a court must look at its purpose and determine how to ap
ply it to the facts in a way that furthers that statute's specific
goals. 215 The Temple concurrence falls victim to the "fallacy of the
transplanted category"216 when it assumes that "under color of law"
in § 7214 should be applied the same way as it is in §§ 242 and 1983.
The concurring opinion overlooks the unique goals of § 7214 and
the differences in the actors and the types of misconduct § 7214 was
intended to reach when it assumes that the phrase "under color of
law" should be applied identically in all three statutes.
For any statute containing the phrase "under color of law" to
apply to a case, there must be some indication of government au
thority that facilitated the wrongdoing. 217 The difficulty is deter
211. See COOK, supra note 181, at 159; Hancock, supra note 171, 546-51.
212. COOK, supra note 181, at 159.
213. See Hancock, supra note 171, at 546-47.
214. Id. at 547.
215. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
216. Hancock, supra note 171, at 547.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941) (holding that ac
tion is taken under color of law only when the "wrongdoer is clothed with the authority
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mining how to measure the presence of such authority: objectively,
subjectively, or by some combination of the twO. 218 A majority of
courts in § 242 and § 1983 cases favor a purely objective analysis,
arguing that consideration of subjective beliefs could allow liability
to be imposed on an official acting in a purely personal capacity,
conduct that §§ 242 and 1983 are constitutionally prevented from
reaching. 219 The problem with the concurring opinion in the Tem
ple case is that it assumes that the search for indicia of authority
should be the same in § 7214(a) as in §§ 242 and 1983: using an
objective standard, but never a purely subjective measure.
Although "under color of law" has the same meaning in all
three statutes, § 7214(a) has a history and purpose unique from that
of the civil rights statutes and should not be applied in the same
way. Using a purely subjective standard to measure whether action
is taken "under color of law" in § 7214(a) is appropriate because it
achieves the purposes of the statute without raising the issues asso
ciated with use of subjective belief in §§ 242 and 1983 cases. This
Section reviews the purpose of § 7214(a) and demonstrates that the
Temple majority achieved the statute's goals using a subjective stan
dard to find that Temple acted "under color of law." Further, this
Section rebuts the concerns raised in the concurring opinion by
demonstrating that application of a subjective standard in § 7214(a)
does not create the same problems as it would in the civil rights
statutes.
1. Using a Subjective Test Achieves the Purposes of
§ 7214(a)
Congress enacted § 7214(a) in the early years of the IRS for a
unique purpose: to remedy the rampant transgressions of Internal
Revenue employees by creating criminal penalties for miscon
duct. 220 Since 1868, that purpose has been expanded to impose a
standard of conduct on any federal employee acting in connection
with a U.S. revenue law and to punish deviations from that stan
dard regardless of whether the employee is acting in an official ca
of ... law"); accord Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109-12 (1945). This is true in
the context of all three sections (242, 1983 and 7214) since they employ the same defini
tion of "under color of law." See supra Part IV. A.
218. See Libby, supra note 9, at 733. See generally supra Part I.B. (reviewing the
approaches courts have taken to the "under color of law" inquiry in §§ 242 and 1983).
219. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 111; supra notes 33-34,40-42 and accompanying text.
220. See CONGo GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 364-66, 3380-450 (1868); supra text
accompanying notes 191-195 (history of § 7214's enactment).
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pacity when such misconduct occurS. 221 As a result, there are two
primary purposes of § 7214(a) today: (1) to set a standard of con
duct for federal employees,222 and (2) to reach any of those employ
ees acting in connection with revenue laws who breach that
standard. 223
To achieve these goals, courts have liberally applied § 7214(a)
to conduct by federal employees that only remotely implicates In
ternal Revenue laws, and without regard whether or not such action
is taken in the course of official duties. 224 Indeed, § 7214(a) has
frequently been applied to actions of federal employees taken in a
purely personal capacity.225 For example, in United States v. Stern,
the court explicitly recognized that the purpose of the statute was
to impose high standards of conduct on federal employees and that,
"[q]uite realistically, some of these derelictions may be committed
outside the performance of the officer's official duties."226
As illustrated by the TempLe majority, using a subjective mea
sure of "under color of law" can successfully carry out the goals of
§ 7214(a). Indeed, the result in TempLe was the conviction of a fed
eral employee whose behavior toward two New York City police
detectives departed from the high standard of conduct demanded of
federal employees under § 7214(a). Temple, a quality analyst for
the IRS, falls into the category of individuals the statute is intended
to reach both because she was an employee of the United States
221. See United States v. Stern, 418 F.2d 198, 199 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v.
Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. McDonald, 26 F. Cas. 1085,
1085 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (No. 15,670) (discussing the "rigid accountability" to which
officers of the government should be held).
222. Section 7214(a) was originally enacted to create a code of conduct for Inter
nal Revenue agents. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
223. Since its enactment, the goal of § 7214(a) has been expanded to impose a
high standard of conduct on all federal employees acting in connection with a revenue
law. See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text.
224. See Johnson, 398 F.2d at 31; supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of conduct in
connection with revenue laws. Because "willful oppression under color of law" is only
one of nine enumerated offenses in § 7214(a), the remainder of which do not require
action to be taken "under color of law," it would be inaccurate to say that preventing
action taken "under color of law" is the main purpose of § 7214(a). See 26 U.S.C
§ 7214(a) (2000). The proper application of the statute for anyone offense must be
determined in light of the purpose of the statute as a whole. See MIKVA & LANE, supra
note 171, at 24 ("A statute should be read to avoid internal inconsistencies.").
225. See Stern, 418 F.2d at 198-99 (holding an IRS agent liable for fraudulent
statements made on his personal tax return); Johnson, 398 F.2d at 31-32 (holding a
revenue agent liable for inaccurate statements on returns prepared by him for others,
outside of work, for compensation, and where his position at the IRS had nothing to do
with the preparation or review of tax returns).
226. Stern, 418 F.2d at 199; accord Johnson, 398 F.2d at 31.
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and, because by telling the detectives she would initiate an audit
against them, she acted in connection with a revenue law. 227
Moreover, Temple's actions amounted to willful oppression of
the detectives "under color of law."228 The majority focused on the
detectives' perception of Temple's official status when she
threatened them as evidence that Temple acted "under color of
law." The detectives' subjective understanding of Temple's con
duct-their belief that she would have them audited-demon
strated that she had misused her authority as an Internal Revenue
employee to threaten the detectives. 229
The majority expressly acknowledged that the purpose of
§ 7214(a) was to punish departures from the high standard of con
duct demanded of federal government officials, and that its holding
accomplished this purpose-concluding that "Temple's ... behavior
. represent[s] a significant departure from those standards."230 Be
cause her threats were related to an Internal Revenue law and were
intentionally made by a federal employee for the purpose of intimi
dation, Temple's actions constituted willful oppression "under color
of law" as defined by § 7214(a).231 The Temple majority was cor
rect to allow the subjective perception of the victims to drive the
analysis of Temple's conduct because doing so satisfied the pur
poses of the statute. Furthermore, using a subjective analysis does
not create the same problems in § 7214(a) that a purely subjective
measure raises in § 242 and § 1983 analyses.
2.

A Subjective Test Does Not Create Problems in
§ 7214(a)

The Temple concurrence focuses on problems caused by the
use of a subjective standard in the "under color of law" inquiry.232
The concurrence's major objection to the use of a subjective stan
227. United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2006), cerro denied,
127 S. Ct. 495 (2006); accord United States v. Temple, 342 F. Supp. 2d 233, 238
(S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 447 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2006). The District Court did acknowl
edge that there may be some dispute on this element of the charge but that "a reasona
ble jury could have found that Temple was acting in connection with the revenue laws
because her threat to the detectives involved IRS audits." Id. at 238.
228. Temple, 447 F.3d at 137-39.
229. [d. at 139 ("[Temple's] oppressive conduct was indeed made possible by her
perceived ability to invoke the ... authority of her department." (emphasis added)).
230. Id.
231. See id. at 137 (defining "willful oppression" as an intentional, unjust exercise
of power).
232. /d. at 141-44 (Wesley, J., concurring).
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dard is that it will destroy the distinction between action taken in a
personal capacity and state action, which is a constitutional prereq
uisite to the applicability of the civil rights statutes. 233 Additionally,
the concurrence is concerned about the possibility of inconsistent
application of "under color of law" statutes given that the victim's
subjective belief is not a consideration under the civil rights stat
utes. 234 However, these concerns are misplaced because they focus
on issues that arise only because of the constitutional limits of
§§ 242 and 1983. As the remainder of this Section will demonstrate,
none of the problems raised by the concurrence exist when applying
a subjective measure of "under color of law" in the context of
§ 7214(a).
a.

Liability for action taken in a personal capacity is permissible
in § 7214(a) cases

In analyses of the phrase "under color of law" in §§ 242 and
1983, the primary concern with relying on the victim's subjective
belief in the actor's authority is that it may create liability for action
taken by an official in a purely personal capacity. Actions taken in
a personal capacity are plainly outside the scope of the civil rights
statutes. Because those statutes seek to prevent the deprivation of
constitutional rights, there must be some connection between the
actor's status and the harm done. 235 The phrase "under color of
law" was used in the civil rights statutes to ensure that the Constitu
tion's state action requirement would be met before those statutes
could apply.236 The concern in § 242 and § 1983 cases is that when
subjective beliefs are considered, "it is no longer the defendant's
status and conduct as a public official ... that determines whether
[the] statute will apply. "237
However, § 7214(a) does not address the deprivation of consti
tutional rights,238 and therefore does not require that the actor have
a connection with the sovereign. Thus, it is not problematic that a
subjective analysis may create liability for personal capacity actions
233. [d. at 144 (stating that use of a subjective standard "would eliminate any
distinction between acts under color of law and personal pursuits"). In § 242 and
§ 1983 cases, most courts have rejected a purely subjective standard of "under color of
law" because it may impose liability on government officials acting in a personal capac
ity. See supra notes 32-35, 40-43 and accompanying text.
234. Temple, 447 F.3d at 145 (Wesley, 1., concurring).
235. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945).
236. See supra notes 33-34, 40-42 and accompanying text.
237. Temple, 447 F.3d at 142 (Wesley, 1., concurring).
238. See 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a) (2000).
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in § 7214(a) cases. On the contrary, § 7214(a) has been expressly
applied to federal employees acting in a personal capacity outside
the scope of their official duties. 239 Congress specifically removed
the requirement that a wrongdoer must act under the authority of
revenue laws,240 and the statute's current language contains no re
quirement that employees be acting in the course of their duties to
be subject to the penalties of § 7214(a).
Under the plain language of § 7214(a), as long as the actor is a
government employee acting in connection with a revenue law, he
may be charged with any of the offenses under the statute. 241 So
long as the two objective criteria of the preamble-that the actor is
both a federal employee and has acted in connection with a revenue
law-are met, it is irrelevant for the purposes of § 7214(a) whether
the actions were taken in a personal or official capacity. Conse
quently, it is not problematic to use a subjective measure of "under
color of law" in § 7214(a), even if it does result in liability for ac
tions taken in a personal capacity because the statute is intended to
reach such conduct.

b.

Subjective approach maintains consistent meaning of "under
color of law"

The concurring opinion in Temple is also concerned that use of
a subjective standard would result in inconsistent application of
statutes containing the phrase "under color of law."242 However,
this concern ignores the subtle distinction between application and
interpretation. 243 Application requires the court to give effect to
the purposes of a specific statute. 244 It is illogical to insist on consis
tent application of the phrase "under color of law" where it is used
in statutes that have distinctly different purposes. 245 Though
§§ 242, 1983, and 7214(a) were all designed to remedy some official
misconduct, they are different types of statutes, distinct from each
other in the group of persons and scope of conduct to which they
apply.
239. See United States v. Stem, 418 F.2d 198, 198-99 (2d Cir. 1969); United States
v. Johnson, 398 F.2d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1968); discussion supra Part II.B.2. .
240. See H. R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 287 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4017,4575.
241. 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a).
242. Temple, 447 F.3d at 145 (Wesley, J., concurring).
243. See supra notes 173-179 and accompanying text (discussing the two
concepts).
244. See USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 171, at 39.
245. See generally Hancock, supra note 171.
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Sections 242 and 1983 are civil rights statutes, originally de
signed to protect the constitutional rights of newly emancipated
slaves. 246 Determining whether action was taken "under color of
law" is a constitutional prerequisite to their application. 247 These
statutes do not name a concrete group of actors to whom they ap
ply. Rather, they are applicable to any person who deprives an
other of her constitutional rights "under color of law"-that is, with
some indication of state authority.248 Therefore, the determination
of whether there is a sufficient connection between the actor and
the sovereign to find that action was taken "under color of law"
becomes the essential element in applying the civil rights
statutes. 249
On the other hand, § 7214(a) is a criminal statute located
within the Internal Revenue Code. It explicitly defines the cate
gory of persons and scope of conduct to which it applies. 250 Addi
tionally, because action taken "under color of law" is an element in
only one of the nine offenses under the statute,251 the "under color
of law" inquiry is not central to the purpose of § 7214(a) as a whole.
Even when a defendant is charged under § 7214(a)(1), the one of
fense that requires action to be taken "under color of law," the
"under color of law" determination is only one element of that of
fense. 252 It is equally important in a § 7214(a) case for the court to
find that the conduct in question was done by a federal employee
acting in connection with a revenue law and that it willfully op
pressed the victim. 253 The scope of the "under color of law" inquiry
is narrower and not of the same constitutional magnitude in
§ 7214(a) than it is in § 242 and § 1983. To require consistent appli
cation among all "under color of law" statutes ignores the distinct
purposes the phrase serves in these different legal contexts.
Alternatively, if the concurrence's real concern is that "under
color of law" be defined consistently across statutes, that concern is
also unfounded because the majority has adopted a meaning of
246. Maloy, supra note 22, at 571-72; supra text accompanying notes 23-24.
247. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text (giving history of the civil
rights statutes).
248. See 18 U.S.c. § 242 (2000); 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000).
249. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 938-39 (1982); supra notes
33-34, 40-42.
250. See 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a) (2000).
251. See id.
252. Section 7214(a)(I) creates an offense for a federal employee "who is guilty
of any extortion or willful oppression under color of law." Id.
253. See id.
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"under color of law" consistent with the civil rights statutes' defini
tion of the phrase. 254 The Supreme Court held that the definition
of "under color of law" in United States v. Classic "formulated a
rule of law which has become the basis of federal enforcement in
this important field. "255 The Temple court abided by this rule, and
adopted the exact meaning of "under color of law" defined in Clas
sic and used in §§ 242 and 1983 cases since. 256 It is sufficient that
there be consistent meaning of "under color of law" among statutes
employing the phrase. Consistent application, however, is unneces
sary and is contrary to the text and purposes of the statute.

c.

Use of a subjective measure will not flood courts with
§ 7214(a) litigation

Finally, the concurrence implies that the application of a sub
jective standard will result in "uncontrolled" use of "under color of
law" statutes, which will flood courts with frivolous litigation. 257
Yet, this concern is unfounded for several reasons. Section 7214( a)
can only be applied to a limited group of people-federal employ
. ees who are acting in connection with a revenue law. 258 In addition,
the statute only prohibits nine specific types of behavior by mem
bers of that group.259 These criteria naturally limit the applicability
of § 7214(a) and, consequently, the number of suits that could arise
under it.
Most important, § 7214(a) only provides a criminal remedy to
be pursued by the government; it does not create a private cause of
action.260 This limits the number of cases § 7214(a) will generate
because the actions alleged must be serious enough to be reported
to, and prosecuted by, the government. Even if subjective beliefs
are allowed to drive the "under color of law" analysis in § 7214(a),
it is highly unlikely that a flood of cases will follow. None of the
254. See United States v. Temple, 447 F.3d 130, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
127 S. Ct. 495 (2006); supra Part I.A.1-.2 (presenting the § 242 and § 1983 definition of
"under color of law").
255. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961) (quoting Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 112-13 (1945», overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
256. Temple, 447 F.3d at 138.
257. See id. at 145 (Wesley, J., concurring).
258. See 26 U.S.c. § 7214(a).
259. See id.
260. See id.; Overton v. United States, 44 F. App'x 932, 933-34 (10th Cir. 2002);
supra Part II.B.3 (no private cause of action under § 7214).
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issues raised by the concurring opinion in TempLe are valid concerns
in the context of § 7214(a).
CONCLUSION

Appropriate application of the phrase "under color of law"
must be determined in the context of the statute in which it ap
pears. The concerns raised in the TempLe concurrence about the
use of a subjective standard261 are misplaced because they focus on
the application of "under color of law" in § 242 and § 1983 cases,
not in the context of § 7214(a). The phrase "under color of law" in
§ 7214(a) is used only to define one type of prohibited conduct
under that statute, and it was not intended to be applied the same
way as it is in the civil rights statutes, where the phrase operates as
a constitutional limitation on the statutes' applicability.262 The
TempLe majority opinion takes the correct approach by defining the
phrase "under color of law" consistently with its definition in §§ 242
and 1983, but applying the phrase differently in § 7214(a) in order
to achieve the purposes of that statute. 263
In § 7214(a) cases, the victim's subjective perception of the
wrongdoer's authority should be considered in the "under color of
law" analysis. Use of a sUbjective standard achieves the purpose of
§ 7214(a)-to impose a high standard of conduct on federal em
ployees acting in connection with Internal Revenue laws. 264 Fur
ther, because objective criteria in the preamble of § 7214(a)
specifically define the category of persons the statute can reach, re
liance on a victim's sUbjective perception cannot create liability in a
party that the statute was not intended to reach. The TempLe ma
jority correctly applied the phrase in the context of § 7214(a) when
it held that Temple acted "under color of law" based on the detec
tives' subjective reaction to her conduct.
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261.
262.
263.
264.

Temple, 447 F.3d at 141 (Wesley, 1., concurring).
See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
Temple, 447 F.3d at 130-39.
See discussion supra Parts ILA, 1I.B.1.

